Using game theory to analyse the current US-Ukraine-Russia interaction

 Yesterday, we witnessed unprecedented scenes in the White House's Oval Office.

The fireside chat of Presidents Trump and Zelensky dissolved into a spat that led to the cancelling of the signing of a deal between the US and Ukraine (the action starts at around minute 40 in the below video).

Below is an attempt to apply the concepts of Nash equilibrium, empty threats, credibility and commitment from game theory to shed some light on this complex situation.

We can probably simplify the current interaction with the below decision tree:

The payoffs are shown at each terminal node, with the order (US payoff, Russia payoff, Ukraine & EU payoff).

The idea here is that if there is no agreement between the US and Russia, the war will continue and all parties will lose somewhat.

If a ceasefire deal is reached, there is a fear that Russia may restart its aggression in 4-5 years, having recovered some of its military strength, which would be a disaster for Ukraine and the EU.

Can you work out the Nash equilibrium with the above structure?

Starting from the last move, according to this interpretation of the incentives, Putin's administration would prefer to renege on the ceasefire deal in 4-5 years and restart its aggression (getting 10 utils instead of 0).

Going back one node, which refers to Russia's choices today, Russia would prefer to pursue a deal, rather than continue with the aggression, in order to recover its military and economic strength (and get eventually a payoff of 10, rather than -5).

In the first node, Trump's administration would prefer to pursue a deal with Russia, even if it eventually reneges, as in the meantime it can enjoy the credit of having stopped a bloody conflict and prevented a nuclear disaster (payoff of 0, rather than -5).

The Nash equilibrium in this game is that the US pursues a deal, Russia agrees, but reneges in 4-5 years.

This is the worst outcome for Ukraine and the EU (-10 utils, as opposed to -5 if the war continues or 0 if there is a permanent ceasefire along the current line of contact), based on the assumption that Russia's military will progress stronger after a pause of 4-5 years.

Now, what can Ukraine and the EU do to avoid this scenario?

One demand that they have is to be part of the negotiations process. How does this change the outcome?

Consider the below decision tree.

As in the previous case, at the last node Russia would prefer to renege on the ceasefire deal after 4-5 years.

However, now Ukraine and the EU would choose to kill the deal and receive a payoff of -5 rather than -10. So the Nash equilibrium in this case is that no ceasefire deal is reached.

The Trump administration would like to avoid this outcome, so it tries to keep Ukraine and the EU out of the negotiations with Russia. President Trump insists that him being in office is a sufficient guarantee for Russia complying with the deal, but Ukraine and the EU see this as an empty promise, rather than as a credible threat to Russia.

The best outcome (from the above options) for Ukraine and the EU is to achieve a permanent ceasefire deal and receive a payoff of 0 rather than -5. How can this be achieved?

Here is where the demand for solid security guarantees comes in play. President Zelensky insists on receiving such guarantees, before agreeing on any deal.

These guarantees would greatly increase the cost for Russia to renege on the ceasefire agreement in 5 years (payoff at -10, rather than 0 with the ceasefire agreement), but they also come at a cost for the Trump administration, changing the payoffs as in the below tree:
  

 

With this tree, the Nash equilibrium is for Russia to comply with the ceasefire agreement (0 utils rather than -10) and in the previous node for Ukraine and the EU to agree with the deal (receive 0 utils rather than -5). 

With these payoffs, the US appears to be indifferent between pursuing a deal with the provision of strong security guarantees to Ukraine and having no ceasefire deal (-5 utils in each case).

The side deal that gives preferential rights to the US for the exploitation of Ukraine's mineral wealth may help with improving the payoffs for the current US administration, resulting in the below tree, where a permanent ceasefire is the game's only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.

Here, US gets 0 utils with the permanent ceasefire deal, as the positive publicity from the Ukraine minerals deal compensates for the publicity cost of committing to Ukraine's long-term security, making it preferable to the no ceasefire outcome (0 rather -5 utils). Ukraine and the EU lose somewhat (-2 utils), but they are still better off compared to the current situation (-5 utils).

The above quick and rough analysis shows how game theory concepts could help us analyse complex negotiations and even find a path to peace.

Περί ελευθερίας, ξανά

Μεγάλωσα στη Σόφια, σε ένα περιβάλλον που διψούσε για ελευθερία και δικαιοσύνη. 

Από μικρό παιδί, θυμάμαι τις συζητήσεις των μεγάλων στο τραπέζι της κουζίνας (δεν είχαμε τραπεζαρία, ούτε κανονικό σαλόνι). 

Η συνηθισμένη γκρίνια για τα καθημερινά προβλήματα κατέληγε σχεδόν πάντα σε βρισίδια στο καταπιεστικό καθεστώς και σε έντονη, παθιασμένη επιθυμία μια μέρα να φύγουμε. Να πάμε να ζήσουμε σε μια "κανονική χώρα", ελεύθεροι.

Κάπου που δεν συμβαίνουν τα παράλογα που συνέβησαν εκείνη τη μέρα (και κάθε μέρα). Κάπου που δεν χρειάζεται να έχεις γνωστό για να αγοράσεις τυρί χωρίς να περιμένεις 1,5 ώρα στο κρύο. Κάπου που το βασικό κριτήριο που προσδιορίζει την κοινωνική σου εξέλιξη και το βιοτικό σου επίπεδο δεν είναι η δεδηλωμένη πίστη σου στο κόμμα και στην ηγεσία του. Κάπου που δεν χρειάζεται να μπεις στα βρώμικα παιχνίδια κλικών που αντιμάχονται για την εύνοια κάποιου μεγάλου παράγοντα. Κάπου που μπορείς να μοιραστείς την άποψή σου, τις αγωνίες σου, τις επιθυμίες σου, χωρίς να ψιθυρίζεις, χωρίς να φοβάσαι.

Τα καταφέραμε, αλλά ταυτόχρονα αποτύχαμε. 

Τη δεκαετία του 1990, αποκτήσαμε φωνή, δεν φοβόμασταν πια να εκφραστούμε, εξαφανίστηκαν οι ατελείωτες ουρές, αλλά κανονική χώρα, όπως την είχαμε φανταστεί, δεν γίναμε. 

Τη θέση του κόμματος, την πήρε η μαφία. Περίπου τα ίδια πρόσωπα, περίπου οι ίδιες κλίκες. Αλλά πολύ πιο φανερή η παρουσία τους, η "επιτυχία" τους, η αλαζονεία τους.

Φύγαμε. Ο καθένας μόνος του. Σε διαφορετική "κανονική χώρα". 

Δεν έχω παράπονο. Νιώθω πολύ καλά στην Ελλάδα. 

Έχω όμως αγωνία. 

Μεγάλη αγωνία. Για την ελευθερία που απολαμβάνω. Που με τόσο κόπο και θυσίες έχει καθιερωθεί και τώρα κινδυνεύει να χαθεί.

Εκφράζω αυτή την αγωνία εδώ και αρκετά χρόνια με κειμενάκια στα κοινωνικά μέσα. Από τότε που συνειδητοποίησα ότι περίπου οι μισοί ψηφοφόροι στην Ελλάδα επιλέγουν κόμματα αντίθετα στην ελευθερία όπως την αντιλαμβάνομαι εγώ.

Η Ελλάδα τη γλίτωσε. Κατά τύχη. Στο τσακ. Προς το παρόν. 

Αλλά η απειλή τώρα είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερη και ουσιαστικότερη από ό,τι ήταν στη μικρή και όμορφη Ελλάδα το 2015.

Ο τρόπος οργάνωσης των διεθνών θεμάτων που θεσπίστηκε μετά το Β' Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο ουσιαστικά καταργείται. Επανέρχονται οι σφαίρες επιρροής και οι αυτοκρατορίες. 

Might is right. The strong do as they will and the weak suffer as they must - η αγαπημένη μου μετάφραση της γνωστής φράσης του Θουκυδίδη (δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν).

Που θα κάτσει η μπίλια, σε ποια σφαίρα επιρροής θα βρεθώ, δεν μου είναι τελείως κατανοητό. Σε κάθε περίπτωση, δεν έχω καμία όρεξη να επιστρέψω στη σφαίρα επιρροής της μοσχοβίας, παρότι ρέει (και) ρωσικό αίμα στις φλέβες μου.   

Δύσκολο και σύνθετο θέμα η ελευθερία. Πώς μπορείς να είσαι ελεύθερος όταν για σχεδόν τα πάντα εξαρτάσαι από άλλους ανθρώπους;

Πολλά σπουδαία βιβλία έχουν γραφτεί για το θέμα. Πολύ μελάνι έχει χυθεί, πολλά πίξελ έχουν καεί. 

Αξίζει όμως να προβληματιστούμε. Ξανά. Από την αρχή. From first principles.

Ο άνθρωπος είναι κοινωνικό ζώο. Χωρίς την υπόλοιπη αγγέλη, δεν πιάνεις τη γκαζέλα. Η μοναξιά είναι μια πολύ μίζερη κατάσταση.

Ταυτόχρονα όμως είμαστε και άτομα. Ο καθένας και καθεμία μας. Με τις δικές του/της επιθυμίες, τις δικές του/της προτιμήσεις, τις δικές του/της παραξενιές.

Αναπόφευκτα αλληλοκαταπιεζόμαστε. Στην δίψα για τη δική μας ελευθερία, γινόμαστε δυνάστες.

Στις φιλελεύθερες, τις "κανονικές" χώρες, έχουν θεσπιστεί θεσμοί που προσπαθούν να περιορίσουν την καταπίεση που ασκούμε στους άλλους, να διασφαλίσουν τις ατομικές ελευθερίες και δικαιώματα. 

Συντάγματα, νόμοι που αφορούν όλους με την ίδια ισχύ, ανεξάρτητη δικαιοσύνη, ελεύθερες και ανταγωνιστικές εκλογές, οργανώσεις της κοινωνίας των πολιτών, αξιοκρατική δημόσια διοίκηση, κοινωνικό κράτος, ανεξάρτητα μέσα ενημέρωσης, άγραφοι νόμοι, έθιμα και συμπεριφορές (social norms), υποστηρίζουν και συντηρούν αυτές τις ελευθερίες και δικαιώματα.

Δυστυχώς, ούτε στις πιο προχωρημένες και ανεπτυγμένες χώρες οι θεσμοί αυτοί δεν εκπληρώνουν καλά τον σκοπό τους. Σκοντάφτουν στα πλέγματα δικτύων συμφερόντων που δημιουργούνται από την άνιση κατανομή κάθε είδους δύναμης και εξουσίας. Παγιώνουν κατεστημένα και σκοτώνουν την πρωτοβουλία. Δεν εξελίσσονται με τις ανάγκες της κοινωνίας. 

Στη δική μας γωνία του κόσμου, είμαστε μακριά από τις προχωρημένες και ανεπτυγμένες χώρες. 

Οι θεσμοί της φιλελεύθερης δημοκρατίας δύσκολα χτίζονται, εύκολα γκρεμίζονται. Όσα checks and balances και να βάλεις, έρχεται μια ημέρα ένας δημοφιλής δικτατορίσκος, με μια σχετικά μικρή ομάδα αποφασισμένων και αφοσιωμένων μπαχαλάκιδων, και διαλύουν τα πάντα σε λίγες εβδομάδες.  

Η λύση στην προβληματική λειτουργία της φιλελεύθερης δημοκρατίας, εάν νοιάζεται κανείς για την ελευθερία και την ευτυχία του ατόμου, κάθε ατόμου, δεν είναι η κατάλυσή της και η αντικατάστασή της με ένα αυταρχικό / κολλεκτιβιστικό καθεστώς. Εάν δεν σου αρέσει το χρώμα του πουλόβερ που φοράς, η λύση δεν είναι να γίνεις γυμνιστής.

Εν τέλει, παραμένω αισιόδοξος. 

Όχι επειδή "το καλό στο τέλος πάντα νικά", όπως στις ταινίες. Δεν συμβαίνει πάντα. Και πώς μπορώ να ισχυριστώ ότι αυτά που πιστεύω είναι το ηθικά καλό, με ένα αντικειμενικό τρόπο;

Είμαι αισιόδοξος επειδή ο αυταρχισμός είναι εγγενώς εύθραυστο καθεστώς. Σκληρό, αλλά σπάει. Δεν έχει την ευελιξία του φιλελευθερισμού. Φτάνει στα όριά του κάποια στιγμή και καταρρέει απότομα.

Μέχρι τότε, τι κάνουμε; 

Αυτό που κάνουν οι φιλελεύθεροι ρώσοι (όχι οι πολιτικάντες που το παίζουν ηγέτες πολιτικών μορφωμάτων, οι κανονικοί άνθρωποι που νοιάζονται πραγματικά για τις ατομικές ελευθερίες και τα δικαιώματα). Εξακολουθώ να τους παρακολουθώ και να μαθαίνω από την εμπειρία τους. 

Πρωτίστως, πρέπει να επιβιώσουμε. Να αντέξουμε ψυχικά και φυσικά. Κρατώντας καλή υγιεινή, σώματος και ψυχής. Good information hygiene. Αποσυνδέοντας τους εαυτούς μας από το θόρυβο, όποτε χρειάζεται.

Μετά, προσπαθούμε να βοηθήσουμε τους άλλους. Τους κοντινούς πρώτα, μετά τους πιο μακρινούς. 

Όπως στις οδηγίες που λαμβάνουμε στις αεροπορικές πτήσεις, πρώτα πρέπει να βάλεις τη μάσκα οξυγόνου στο δικό σου πρόσωπο, πριν προχωρήσεις στο να βοηθήσεις άλλους, ακόμα και το παιδί σου. 

Μικρές πράξεις καλοσύνης go a long way. You are not alone.

Όποια πολιτική δράση, έρχεται τελευταία, στο μέτρο του καθενός. 

Ο φιλελευθερισμός δεν απαιτεί ηρωικές πράξεις. Η δύναμή του δεν βασίζεται σε μεμονωμένες ατομικές θυσίες. 

Ο φιλελευθερισμός θέλει υπομονή. Βασίζεται στη συστηματική δουλειά χιλιάδων ανθρώπων που κάνουν μικρά βήματα στην καθημερινότητά τους για βελτίωση της λειτουργίας των θεσμών. Ο καθένας στο πεδίο του. 

Εύχομαι να έχουμε την υπομονή να ξεπεράσουμε αυτή τη θύελλα σώοι και αβλαβείς και να συνεχίσουμε να απολαμβάνουμε τους καρπούς του φιλελευθερισμού, χωρίς αγωνίες και φόβους. 

Russia will be free

Russia will become a free and democratic country.

As free and as democratic as any other in the EU. Freer and more democratic than some of the others on the continent.

This is a prediction that runs counter to trends. Counter to recent events. But exactly these events freed me from any doubts about the future of Russia as a free and democratic country.
The murder of Navalny (whichever way it happened, the slow or the sudden) is a seismic event. The shock that it created through the healthy liberal segment of Russian society is commensurable to the shock from the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Navalny was, is, has become Russia's Martin Luther King. Russia's Mandela. Russia's Ghandi. A beacon that guides moral sentiment. A sacrifice that clears the path. A myth.

The deep sorrow, genuine anguish that has rippled through liberal Russia is gradually turning to resolve. The seeds for new Navalnys, new Nemtsovs have been planted.

The new Navalnys and Nemtsovs will turn Mordor into a free and prosperous country.

I cannot predict the chronology or sequence of events that will lead to this outcome.

Will there be a Russia Spring in March-April this year? A military coup in December? A widespread rebellion on the frontlines in the summer of 2025? A breakout republic declaring independence in the winter of 2026? Infights of siloviki fractions turning to a full-blown civil war following Putin's death in 2048?

I don't know. No one does.

But the little Russianhood left in me tells me that I can be certain of the final outcome, whenever it will come.

The current regime is ruling purely based on "might is right". There is no ideology behind its repressions.

Yes, the majority of Russia's society is zombied into conspiratorial thinking. Yes, the silovikis' grip on power is only getting stronger. But there is no coherent narrative that grabs hearts and minds.

No one will charge enemy lines because of some 11th-century bullshit. No one will fight an overwhelming crowd of angry protesters to prevent gender-neutral public toilets.

Once the oil money, fuelling the war, repression, suppression, and propaganda machines, dries out. Once it becomes clear that the power of Putin's cronies is wavering. The floodgates of anger will open and the regime will collapse. In a single day.

The Soviet generation will not live forever.

The time will come when the generations of Navalny, Yashin, and even younger bright people will outnumber the Soviet aparatchicks. The generations watching Rick and Morty, rather than Seventeen Moments of Spring, will eventually prevail.

The first milestone to watch - 17 March.

The results of the so-called elections happening on that date are already known. Decided in advance. At least 80% will vote for Sauron, with at least 70% participation in the polls.

But exactly at noon, in polling stations spread over this vast territory and across numerous time zones, the Rick-and-Morty generations will come together, after a 4-year ban on public demonstrations (due to COVID, supposedly). They will vote for Navalny, spoil the bulletin in another way, or cast a vote for one of the three stooges that the regime put on the ballot alongside ввх. They will do their best to screw up with this mimicry of a democratic process.

No, this will probably not start a revolution. But it will provide an opportunity for liberal Russia to reconfirm its existence. To show its strength and resolve. To spook the aparatchicks, one more time. To draw strength for the next small step on the road to freedom.

I will try to follow these events and channel the vibes here as events unfold (or don't). Stay tuned.

2023 puzzles, 2024 answers

2023 was a puzzling year. It defied expectations on a number of fronts.

In Ukraine/Russia, there were expectations that the war's staggering casualties and unclear aims for the Russian side would have demoralised its soldiers sufficiently so that with the first strong Ukrainian offensive, the front would crumble.

In the US, there were expectations that charging DJT on 91 counts, including financial fraud, passing around government secrets, and insurrection to overthrow the constitutional order, was serious enough to turn voters away from this stinking blob of bile.

It seems that in these two particular instances at least, the masses no longer behave as expected by some members of the highly educated liberal elites. These instances might turn out to be symptoms of a more fundamental process - the approaching end of liberal democracy/free market economy/capitalism.

The way societies have organised their economic and political order throughout history has not been independent of technology. The reproductive chances and thus success of various institutions and power structures have proven to be very different in hunter-gatherer, agrarian, industrial, and post-industrial societies. Take, for example, slavery or feudal ties of peasants to land - largely unnecessary in nomadic societies, essential in ancient, medieval, and pre-industial agrarian societies, and an impediment to power accumulation in industrial and post-industrial societies where labour has to be mobile and to some extent creative. 

Technological innovations have been major drivers of change in the social order. The discovery of new ways to produce metals, cultivate the land, mechanise labour, reproduce information, changed not only the productivity of specific workers - it changed how societies organised their economies, fought wars, thought about ethics and morals, and set their structures of political power. 

Consider the invention of the printing press in 1440. A few decades later, discontent with practices tolerated and encouraged by the leadership of the Church swept a large section of its congregation, leading to bloody wars and conflicts, lasting for decades and claiming victims for centuries to come. The new doctrine of Protestantism that emerged from this process fundamentally changed the power relations in the economy and society, enabling the creation of the liberal/market-economy/capitalist institutions that took hold later on. But without the printing press, the rumblings of a disgruntled member of the clergy, rather than receive the mass distribution that they did by being printed and posted on church doors across the land, would most probably have had the fate of similar ramblings of countless predecessors.

Is social media the new printing press that is transforming how we produce, spread, and consume information, and ultimately how we think about the surrounding world? Are drones and automated weapons the new iron that would determine who will dominate on the battlefields and thus in the geopolitical arena? Is AI the new steam engine that will determine what jobs but also what type of labour relations will prevail in the future?

2024 will provide a lot more data that would shed light on the path to finding answers to these puzzles.

It is highly likely that in the first half of the year, millions of people will vote with conviction for DJT in the Republican primaries and for VVP in the March presidential plebiscite. What happens in the second half of the year is less certain and much more consequential.

If DJT loses, the MAGA wave might swiftly die down. Fundamental tensions in the US society may not be resolved so easily, but with economic growth and appropriate social policies, they may be ironed out until the next major crisis. With the West not collapsing (yet?) and continuing to assist Ukraine, VVP's deadly grip on the levers of power may loosen sufficiently for the war front (or the empire itself) to start to crumble on the edges, leading eventually to a regime change.

By contrast, if the proud deplorables are numerous enough in the few places that matter to bring DJT back in the White House, despite likely criminal convictions - if the mobniks continue to march en masse to their slaughter, without much of a protest - this will reveal that in a world of information overload, social media bubbles, and epistemological confusion, there is no need for mass repression/suppression of dissenting voices for totalitarian/authoritarian institutions to prevail.

Time (the year 2024 in particular) will tell whether DJT and VVP are just temporary glitches on a path of social progress or harbingers of a dystopian future. 

Age of Extremism

A new Age of Extremes is upon us.

Extremists have taken over the world affairs. They are steering the wheel, pressing the gas, frantically screaming as they head into the nearest precipice, with the rest of us thrown around as limp cargo at the back. 

Extremists have turned the Earth's most densely populated 365 square km into a launchpad for horrendous terror attacks and almost daily rocket launches.

Extremists have buried the peace process, convincing the Israeli public that oppression and disrespect for the human condition of millions can sustain in perpetuity a safe and prosperous existence for the remaining population.

Extremists have turned a large area, a little bit further NorthEast, home to some of the world's oldest cultural traditions, into a training ground for terrorists, a supplier to aggressors, a violent suppressor of women and descending voices.

Extremists in charge of the largest landmass on earth have started a bloody war against a neighbouring country, with no end in sight, threatening the world with a nuclear armageddon if their geopolitical wet dreams do not materialise.

Extremists in what used to be the most populous country in the world are ramping up their military fast, also dreaming of imperial expansion.

Extremists in what is now the most populous country in the world are eroding the country's democratic institutions and traditions, dreaming of ethnic purity along religious lines.

Extremists in the world's top economy are holding hostage the country's legislative branch, readying to have another go at destroying the country's democracy, which withstood a four-year attack from the very top.

Extremists in what used to be the world's major power before that managed to convince its population that it should abandon the world's most promising experiment at building a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous coexistence, despite differences in language, culture, and history, over what used to be the world's bloodiest continent.

Extremists in my neck of the woods almost achieved the same, but at the last moment, reason prevailed.

The extremists are winning, but they haven't won yet. 

The extremists grow and feed on each other's extremism. They need strong extremists in their opposition in order to draw power and support. If there are none, the extremists will invent them. But the extremists stand little chance of success against an organised, determined, resolute non-extremist majority. 

Extremists have a strong sway of the narrative, a large chunk of the information space, and even some major levers of power. But in most places, they remain a minority.

The extremists have created a polarised world where it is impossible not to pick sides. Even if you try to stay away from tragic choices, the extremists will decide for you which side to put you on and then punish you accordingly. 

In this polarised world, the most important strategy choice is where to draw the lines of bifurcation. If you side with an extremist, you become an extremist, and extremism thus gains further ground.

So, what could identify and unite an anti-extremist pole?

First, absolute respect of basic human rights. No matter how hideous a terror attack or an aggression, no matter how excruciating the pain, the sorrow, the grief are, there is no justification for committing or tolerating war crimes or ethnic cleansing, nor is there for turning away refugees.

Second, freedom of speech and a prevalence of empirical facts over emotive narratives, conspiracy theories, and propaganda. All opinions have the right to be heard, but the truth is not a matter of opinion. There are standards for establishing facts that should be adhered to. This is a point both for keeping good information hygiene at the personal level and for holding media and institutions accountable for maintaining solid standards on facts at the collective level.

Third and last, the rule of law and non-violence. There are many wrongs in the world, but they should be righted only through due process. If there is no resolution available through courts and votes, campaigning, strikes, peaceful resistance, civil disobedience take precedence over armed struggle. Violence is only permitted in defence, in response to aggression, and only to the extent that it causes less suffering than the evil it prevents (here and now, in the material world and not in metaphysical constructs).

All other issues come secondary in the age of extremes.

Political competition is the cornerstone of liberal democracies. We can and should continue to disagree and argue about taxation, welfare, the role of the state, the best policies for achieving goals, the best people in charge of setting policies and goals, etc., etc. However, we should no longer tolerate coalitions, coexistence on the same political platform, or geopolitical alliances with individuals, groups, or leaders that do not respect the above three minimum standards of anti-extremism.

We can still avoid a total catastrophe, but we are running out of time.

15% hope

The coming week will mark one year since the start of the nightmare in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion took me by surprise. One year ago, it was totally unbelievable to me that a war of such scale could take place between Russia and Ukraine - two segments of my own heritage. 

Yes, there was fighting in Donbas in 2014-2015, with some exchange of fire taking place since then, but nothing comparable to what's happening since last February, with more than 200,000 deaths so far and a meat grinder of about 1000 souls per day at the current rate.

My reaction to the invasion, perhaps not very wisely, was to rediscover my connection with Donbas and more generally with my Russian and Ukrainian heritage. 

I looked for and found on the map the village where my mother was born (on the frontline, on the side controlled by the Ukrainian forces, currently under heavy Russian attack). I looked for and found on the map the town where she grew up as a teenager and where my (Ukrainian) grandmother and (Russian) grandfather are buried (on the frontline, on the side controlled since 2014 by the pro-Kremlin forces). 

Since last February, a number of Russian and Ukrainian telegram channels and podcasts have made it into my daily routine. I've learned a lot more than I knew before about the history and politics of Russia, Ukraine, and the wider region. I dare say that my Russian is now in much better shape than it was a year ago, while Duolingo informs me that I can boast of having mastered 604 Ukrainian words so far.

One year is a long time for a nightmare. The human psyche is not fit to deal with such horrors over such a long time. The mind finds mechanisms to cope.

For those like me living far from the frontline, without having to constantly dread the fate of friends and close relatives that fight or live on the frontline, coping is not that hard. The war appears from time to time on the newsreel, but it is not that hard to put it on the back burner and concentrate on more immediate concerns. 

For those more directly involved, coping is harder, but not impossible. 

On the Ukrainian side, the most common psychological coping mechanism is fairly straightforward. An invading force has come to get you - you need to take care of your physical survival. The enemy is pure evil. They shoot at you, torture you, rape you. Dealing with this is very hard, very painful, but psychologically, philosophically, it is rather straightforward - you fight or you die (or surrender, which in some cases may be an even worse outcome).

On the Russian side, a large section of society also seems to cope successfully with this nightmare. For them, it is not entirely clear why there is a special military operation for a whole year in Ukraine, but the 8-year limbo of Donbas had to end somehow. They believe there is a horrible ruling class in Ukraine, puppets of the evil West who, with the help of extremists, nationalistic propaganda, and money from the West, suppress and brainwash their fellow men and women. Some people die in the special military operation, but defending the pride of the nation comes at a price. The glorious history of Russia is built on the sacrifice of national heroes. No room for whining during historic times.

There is, however, a small section of Russian society that has no coping mechanism available - people holding western, liberal, humanitarian, scientific, materialistic outlook. A section that has to live with a never-ending, never quieting cognitive dissonance. A section that in some sociological studies is estimated to correspond to about 15% of society within the country and perhaps a larger portion of its diaspora.

They see the horrible crimes committed by their fellow countrymen, by watching, reading or listening to banned or suppressed sources, and they don't attribute these crimes to propaganda staged by the West. They see whole towns and cities raised to the ground by the artillery of their own army, towns and cities largely inhabited by people speaking the same language as theirs. People who lived for decades in the same country as them, with the same or similar cultural code as them. People who may be distant or even close relatives of theirs.

They cannot dismiss the perpetrators of these crimes as being genetically or culturally evil. They recognise that this whole tragedy is brought upon by their own kind, their own neighbours, their own family. They realise that they are genetically, culturally destined to be seen on the side of evil. For as long as they live, the crimes of their countrymen will tarnish their own reputation too. And they feel completely helpless to change that. The few that tried are rotting away, somewhere far away, in the cold, harsh colonies of the Russian penal system. 

This nightmare cannot end as aspired by the various cognitively settled archetypes described above. It will not end with Putin taking poison hours before the allied forces break into his bunker in Moscow. It will not end with Russia restoring its sphere of influence from the Soviet era. 

The nightmare will not end by fizzling out, slowly dropping off the newsreel until we all forget about it. Russia is too big, too close to Europe, to become a North Korea, a slightly annoying but largely harmless oddity. 

The crimes the Russian troops committed, the nuclear threats the country's leadership levied, have been too numerous, too odious to be forgotten. Russia slipping silently back into the world economy is also not a realistic scenario. 

The only non-apocalyptic end to this nightmare, in my humble opinion, is for that 15% of Russians with cognitive dissonance to become 16%, then 17%, then 20%, then enough percent so that it fights off, cuts off the cancerous monstrosity, the death cult that has taken over the country's leadership and the minds of the majority in their country.

15% is not much, but this 15% is our only hope.

Putin is right - the existing world order is no more

So, here we are. At a point of no return. 

Even the slimmest hope of a peace treaty that would restore the pre-invasion status quo was irreversibly killed off yesterday. About 15% of Ukraine is now (within the Russian legal universe) part of Russia and according to the Russian constitution, it can never agree with anyone on giving it up. 

Either we accept and learn to live with this land grab (which would only encourage further expansion and aggression) or Russia is pushed back to the point where its constitutional order falls apart. In any case, one thing is certain (given Russia's veto power at the UN Security Council) - the post-WWII world order is no more.

Many people are surprised that we have come thus far. Many of us are still willing to dismiss the threats and continue our business as usual, preparing powerpoint presentations, procrastinating with funny cat videos. But if you've had the joy to follow the public discourse in Russia, the current juncture should not come as a surprise.

If we are to understand what might happen next, I do believe that it would be to our advantage to start taking Putin seriously.

If we do not understand what is going on with Russia and are being taken by surprise all the time with how it rolls, it is high time to change the analytical frame with which we approach it. Even today (e.g. on the otherwise excellent Economist podcast The Intelligence), commentators dismissed Putin's yesterday speech as a bluff, aimed to scare the West into submission, which sets the stage for more surprises as we go forward. 

In our liberal democracies, we have learned not to take the words of politicians at face value. The politicians would say anything to further their popularity. In the end, no matter what they say, they do what their support base wants, which as a rule does not involve mass suicide. But Russia is not a liberal democracy.

Analyzing the situation through the lens of our own worldview is leading us astray. We need to take a broader view and see what the other side is saying, through its own analytical frame. 

When the world's largest landmass is pointing the world's largest nuclear arsenal at you, saying that it is fighting an existential war with you, you should start paying attention to what it has been saying all along for years. 

This is not a regional conflict. It is not a war over resources, trade routes, minority rights, or what have you. This is a war to overturn the existing world order, at any cost. 

This is a war between two different worldviews, two different ideologies, two different epistemologies that can no longer coexist peacefully.

In the Western corner, we have the liberal approach that has largely shaped the post-WWII world order (since 1945 in the West and since the early 1990s worldwide). It is supposed to be a rules-based system. Equality before the law. The analytical unit is the individual. The individuals' rights, wants, preferences, votes are the source of power, right, and goodness for the collective. This is supposed to hold for individuals, but also for states that are supposed to follow the UN charter and abide by the decisions of supranational bodies of law. The aim is to have an integrated world economy, with a free flow of goods and resources, which maximises economic growth and material prosperity and smooths over historical grudges. Individuality, experimentation, diversity are desirable, as they are conducive to happiness, generate innovation, drive technological change, and further social progress. Social safety nets, free and engaged civil society, independent judicial system and independent authorities, checks and balances, are in place to smooth inequalities, enable social mobility and ensure cohesion in the system. At the epistemological level, knowledge is acquired by having various hypotheses compete to fit better with facts, established through collectively accepted rules and procedures. 

In the Eurasian/fascist/communist/totalitarian corner, the fundamental analytical unit is the collective. The individuals are shaped by and within the collective to which they belong, through the collective's traditions and customs. The ultimate goal of each collective is to persevere against other encroaching collectives. For the collective to survive, it has to fight to preserve its identity and customs. Governance modes and authority draw from the collective's history. Great leaders have shaped history by imposing their strong will to expand the collective. A great leader is not guided by people's whims - he secures people's support for his aims by all means he has in his disposal. Happiness is a secondary, variable outcome that comes from congruence with the collective will, which is primary and fixed. Social outcomes come through a power struggle of collectives. The stronger will wins. Rules are written by the winners to suppress the losers. Equality, happiness, justice, sustainability, SDGs, CRS, ESG, LGBTQ+ etc. are buzzwords and buzz acronyms of Western elites that are used to suppress the masses. Individuality, diversity, experimentation are suppressed, as they undermine authority, blur the collective's identity, and threaten its chances for survival. At the epistemological level, truth is established by authority alone. Within a liberal society, it is possible to have illiberal worldviews, but the opposite does not hold. 

So, with this in mind, what can we expect to happen next? One thing is certain - we cannot go back to the pre-2022 world of an integrated global economy and institutions, without a change in Russia's constitutional order. 

One of the two competing worldviews has to prevail. Either Russia loses and liberal order is restored (hopefully in a more coherent version, without a hegemon, with working institutions and significantly less hypocracy) or we plunge into a multipolar world of competing great powers. In the second case, the fate of Europe or at least many of its nations is far from certain. The path to any of these outcomes may involve the use of nuclear weapons, or it may not. Only time can tell.

Before going back to presentations and funny cat videos, I leave you with a quote from a Russian history podcast that I heard a few weeks back - the death of Gorbachev and Queen Elizabeth II marked the end of the 20th century, while the death of Putin will mark the end of the 19th century.

Further reading: Putin: "The End of Western Hegemony is INEVITABLE"  

And here is an account with great funny cat (and other animal) videos: https://twitter.com/buitengebieden